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Abstract 
Trust is an important aspect of decision making for Internet applications and 
particularly influences the specification of security policy i.e. who is authorised to 
perform actions as well as the techniques needed to manage and implement security 
to and for the applications. This survey examines the various definitions of trust in the 
literature and provides a working definition of trust for Internet applications.   The 
properties of trust relationships are explained and classes of different types of trust 
identified in the literature are discussed with examples.  Some influential examples of 
trust management systems are described. 
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1 MOTIVATION 
Internet services are increasingly being used in daily life for electronic commerce, web-based 
access to information and inter-personal interactions via electronic mail rather than voice or face-
to-face, but there is still major concern about the trustworthiness of these services. There are no 
accepted techniques or tools for specification and reasoning about the trust. There is a need for a 
high-level, abstract way of specifying and managing trust, which can be easily integrated into 
applications and used on any platform. Typical applications requiring a formal trust specification 
include content selection for web documents [1], medical systems [2], telecommuting [3], mobile 
code and mobile computing [4-6], as well as electronic commerce [7-14].  Our main motivation 
in studying trust specification and management is to use this as the starting point for subsequent 
refinement into security policies related to authorisation and management of security [15].  
However, there are additional reasons as to why trust is an important concept for modern 
systems. 
The migration from centralised information systems to internet-based applications will mean that 
transactions have to span a range of domains and organisations [16], not all of which may be 
trusted to the same extent.  Inconsistencies in current trust relationships highlight the need for a 
flexible, general-purpose trust management system that can navigate these (possibly) complex 
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trust domains.   A domain may need to support a range of different trust relationships and hence 
be capable of supporting different types of security policy [17]. 
Trust decisions are currently hard-coded into an application, which adds to the complexity of the 
application and the inability to adapt to changes in trust and lack of flexibility when setting up 
new relationships.  A separation of the application’s purpose and its trust management 
framework will offer a more scalable and flexible solution for the distributed environment. 
Trust is a vital component in every business transaction.  Customers must trust that sellers will 
provide the services they advertise, and will not disclose private customer information (name, 
address, credit card details, purchases etc.).  Trust in the supplier’s competence and honesty will 
influence the customer’s decision as to which supplier to use.  Sellers must trust that the buyer is 
able to pay for goods or services, is authorised to make purchases on behalf of an organisation or 
is not underage for accessing service or purchasing certain goods.  Thus, for Internet commerce 
to achieve the same levels of acceptance as traditional commerce, trust management has to be an 
intrinsic part of e-commerce.   
Trust is usually specified in terms of a relationship between a trustor, the subject that trusts a 
target entity, which is known as the trustee i.e. the entity that is trusted.  Trust forms the basis for 
allowing a trustee to use or manipulate resources owned by a trustor or may influence a trustor’s 
decision to use a service provided by a trustee.  Thus, trust can form an important factor in 
decision-making [18-20].  The level of trust has an approximate inverse relationship to the 
degree of risk with respect to a service or an e-commerce transaction [21-23], but there has been 
very little work on using risk management frameworks for trust management or on the analysis 
of the exact relationship between risk and trust.  In many current business relationships, trust is 
based on a combination of judgement or opinion based on face-to-face meetings or 
recommendations of colleagues, friends and business partners.  However, there is a need for a 
more formalised approach to trust establishment, evaluation and analysis to support Internet 
services, which generally do not involve human interaction.  
In this survey we focus on trust in the context of networked and distributed computing systems, 
in which it is not just the remote system that needs to be trusted, but also interactions over 
underlying services such as communication services.  Our focus is on modelling trust, so that it 
can be used in automated systems.  Work on the creation of computer frameworks of the entire 
social concept of trust, though pertinent, is not our emphasis.   
There is considerable variation in the meaning of trust as used in the literature.  In the following 
section we review the various definitions and suggest a definition applicable to internet services 
and then discuss trust properties and relationships in more detail in section 3.  In section 4 we 
classify the different types of trust we have identified in the literature. In section 5 we introduce 
the concept of trust management and in section 6 we describe examples of trust management 
solutions in more detail.  We elaborate on some of the application areas for trust management in 
section 7, followed by a summary of the key ideas and future research directions.   
2 DEFINING TRUST 
Trust is a complex subject relating to belief in honesty, truthfulness, competence, reliability etc. 
of the trusted person or service.  There is no consensus in the literature on what trust is and on 
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what constitutes trust management [21, 23], though many research scientists recognise its 
importance [24, 25].  The significance of incorporating trust in distributed systems is that trust is 
an enabling technology.  Its inclusion will enable Internet commerce and seamless, secure agent-
based applications.  Despite the need to standardize trust and its related concepts, many 
researchers simply use and assume a definition of trust in a very specific way relating to topics 
such as authentication, or ability to pay for purchases.  However, a few authors have tried to 
view trust in a generic way.  
Kini and Choobineh [26] in their considerations on the theoretical framework of trust, examine it 
from the perspectives of personality theorists, sociologists, economists and social psychologists.  
They state that trust, as defined in the Webster dictionary, is: 
 An assumed reliance on some person or thing.  A confident dependence on the character, 
ability, strength or truth of someone or something. 
 A charge or duty imposed in faith or confidence or as a condition of a relationship. 
 To place confidence (in an entity). 
They highlight the implications of these definitions and combine their results with the social 
psychological perspective of trust to create their definition of trust in a system – “a belief that is 
influenced by the individual’s opinion about certain critical system features” [26].  Their 
discussion, though general in concept, concentrated on human trust in Electronic Commerce, but 
did not address trust between the entities involved in an E-Commerce transaction. 
The European Commission Joint Research Centre defines trust as “the property of a business 
relationship, such that reliance can be placed on the business partners and the business 
transactions developed with them” [27].  This view of trust is from a business management 
perspective and offers an interesting analysis of what must be done to enable trust in E-
Commerce.  They state that the issues of the identification and reliability of business partners, 
the confidentiality of sensitive information, the integrity of valuable information, the prevention 
of unauthorized copying and use of information, guaranteed quality of digital goods, availability 
of critical information, the management of risks to critical information, and the dependability of 
computer services and systems (specifically the availability, reliability and integrity of 
infrastructure, the prevention of unauthorised use of infrastructure, guaranteed level of services 
and the management of risks to critical infrastructure) are key to the emergence of E-Commerce 
as a viable commercial activity.  
The Oxford Reference Dictionary states that trust is “the firm belief in the reliability or truth or 
strength of an entity”.  A trustworthy entity will typically have a high reliability and so will not 
fail during the course of an interaction, will perform a service or action within a reasonable 
period of time, will tell the truth and be honest with respect to interactions and will not disclose 
confidential information.  Competence is a better term than strength for the environment related 
to services and computing system, i.e. an entity should be capable of performing the functions 
expected of it or the service it is meant to provide correctly and within reasonable timescales.  
Thus, trust is really a composition of many different attributes – reliability, dependability, 
honesty, truthfulness, security, competence, and timeliness, which may have to be considered 
depending on the environment in which trust is being specified.   
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Trust is a vast topic that incorporates trust establishment, trust management and security 
concerns.  The lack of consensus with regards to trust, has led authors to use the terms trust, 
authorisation and authentication interchangeably.  The outcome of a trust decision is based on 
many things such as the trustor’s propensity to trust, its beliefs and past experiences relating to 
the trustee.   
Authorisation can be seen as the outcome of the refinement of a more abstract trust relationship.  
For example, if I develop a trust relationship with a particular student, I may authorise him to 
install software on my computer and hence set up the necessary access control rights to permit 
access.  We define authorisation as a policy decision assigning access control rights for a subject 
to perform specific actions on a specific target with defined constraints.  
Authentication is the verification of an identity of an entity, which may be performed by means 
of a password, a trusted authentication service or using certificates.  There is then an issue of the 
degree of trust in the entity, which issued the certificate.  Note that authorisation may not be 
necessarily specified in terms of an identity.  Anonymous authorisation can be implemented 
using capabilities or certificates [28].   
We define trust as “the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, securely and 
reliably within a specified context” (assuming dependability covers reliability and timeliness).  
Distrust may be a useful concept to specify as a means of revoking previously agreed trust or for 
environments when entities are trusted, by default, and it is necessary to identify some entities 
which are not trusted.  We define distrust as “the lack of firm belief in the competence of an 
entity to act dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context”.  
We now examine some of the properties of trust relationships in more detail. 
3 PROPERTIES OF TRUST RELATIONSHIPS 
In general, a trust relationship is not absolute – A will never trust B to do any possible action it 
may choose.  A trustor trusts a trustee with respect to its ability to perform a specific action or 
provide a specific service within a context.  For example, a person is only trusted to deal with 
financial transactions less than $2000 in value.  Even trust in oneself is not usually absolute and 
there is a need to protect resources you own from mistakes or accidents you may cause.  
Examples include protecting files from accidental deletion or mechanisms to prevent a person 
driving a car when under the influence of alcohol.    
A trust relationship can be one-to-one between two entities, however it may not be symmetric.  
A’s trust in B is not usually the same as B’s trust in A.  It may be a one-to-many relationship in 
that it can apply to a group of entities such as the set of students in a particular year.  It can also 
be many-to-many such as the mutual trust between members of a group or a committee, or 
many-to-one such as several departments trusting a corporate head branch.  In general, the 
entities involved in a trust relationship will be distributed and may have no direct knowledge of 
each other so there is a need for mechanisms to support establishment of trust relationships 
between distributed entities. 
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There have been suggestions that trust relationships should not be transitive [23], however, some 
trust scenarios do exhibit transitivity.   The concept of trust delegation is a prime example of the 
application of trust transitivity.  When I delegate my trust decisions to another, for example John, 
I authorize John to make trust decisions on my behalf.  Thus, when I delegate to John and John 
trusts an unknown entity (say Tim), John is essentially stating that I trust Tim.  According to 
Christianson and Harbison in [29] the concept of transitivity should be avoided, as it can result in 
entity B adding trust assertions to an entity A’s trust base without A’s explicit consent leading to 
unintentional transitivity. We agree that transitivity of trust may have unexpected and adverse 
results if it implies updating the trust base of a trustor to include derived assertions, but it is may 
be necessary in some situations.  We consider transitivity to be inherent in some relationships 
and so should be considered in the analysis of trust systems in order to determine which 
undesired side effects should be prevented. 
There is often a level of trust associated with a relationship [30].  Some entities may be trusted 
more than others with respect to performing an action.  It is not clear whether this level should be 
discrete or continuous.  If discrete values are used, then a qualitative label such as high, medium 
or low may be sufficient.  Some systems support arithmetic operations on trust recommendations 
so numeric quantification is more appropriate. It is also possible to provide a mapping from 
qualitative to numeric labels. However, there is still a problem relating to representation of 
ignorance (or the unknown) with respect to trust.   
Jøsang’s Opinion Model, based on subjective logic, may be a suitable technique for assigning 
trust values in the face of uncertainty [31-34]. An opinion is a representation of a belief and is 
modelled as a triplet, consisting of: b (a measure of one’s belief), d (a measure of one’s disbelief) 
and i (a measure of ignorance); such that b + d + i = 1.  It is assumed that b, d and i are 
continuous and between 0 and 1 (inclusive).  This model’s strength lies in the ability to reason 
about the opinions (on a mathematically sound basis) and its consensus, recommendation and 
ordering operators [31].  However, its major weakness is that it cannot be guaranteed that users 
will accurately assign values appropriately.  
From the literature it is clear that there are many different types of trust, which relate to the 
specific purposes or nature of a trust relationship. In the following section we provide a 
classification of the types of trust. 
4 TRUST CLASSIFICATION 
We have identified different forms of trust in the literature relating to whether access is being 
provided to the trustor’s resources, the trustee is providing a service, trust concerns 
authentication or it is being delegated.  This is not meant to be an exhaustive taxonomy, but 
merely a useful way of classifying the literature relating to trust in internet services.   
4.1 Access to a Trustor’s Resources 
A trustor trusts a trustee to use resources that he owns or controls, which could be a software 
execution environment or an application service [35-37].  Abrams and Joyce [35] highlight the 
fact that resource access trust has been the focus for security specialists for many decades, 
although the emphasis has mostly been on mechanisms supporting access control.  
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There is an obvious distinction between trusting an entity to read or write a file on your server 
and trusting an entity to execute code within your workstation.   Simple file access requires that 
the trustee will follow the correct protocol, will not divulge information read, and will write only 
correct data etc.  Allowing an entity to execute code on your workstation implies a much higher 
level of trust. The code is expected not to damage the trustor’s resources, to terminate within 
reasonable finite time and not to exceed some defined resource limits with respect to memory, 
processor time, local file space etc. 
In [35, 36], the authors implicitly map trust decisions to access control decisions.  Generally, 
resource access trust can form the basis for specifying authorisation policy, which then is 
implemented using operating system or database access control mechanisms, firewall rules etc.  
The trust relationship can be refined into authorisation policies that specify actions the trustee 
can perform on the trustor’s resources and constraints that apply, such as time periods for when 
the access is permitted. 
Examples of Resource Access Trust 
 Fred is trusted to do Linux installations and Joe is trusted to do NT installations on our 
section workstations. 
 Third year and above students are trusted to use the parallel processing service. 
 I trust XY Cleaners to send someone to clean my house even when I am not there. 
 I distrust AB Garage so I will not take my car to be repaired there. 
These rather abstract specifications of trust and distrust would need to be refined into specific 
authorisations policies that define permitted operations to specific resources.   
4.2 Provision of Service by the Trustee 
The trustor trusts the trustee to provide a service that does not involve access to the trustor’s 
resources.  Note this may not be true of many services such as web services that download 
applets and cookies, and so do require access to resources owned by the trustor.   
Service bureaux and application service providers (ASPs) [38-40] are prime examples of entities 
that would require service provision trust to be established.  Currently, in these domains, trust is 
often an unstated implication of establishing a relationship, which is difficult to enforce or 
monitor.   Mobile code and mobile agent based applications obviously must trust the execution 
environment provided by the remote system (provision of service trust) but the execution 
environment should not be damaged by the mobile code (access to resources trust).  
Examples of Service Provision Trust  
 I trust a film recommendation service to only recommend films that are not pornographic. 
 I trust website xyz to provide information that is non-offensive. 
 I distrust sexy-Susan website. 
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The above examples are a form of confidence trust in that the trustor has confidence in (or 
specifically distrusts) the standard of service provided by the service provider.  This type of trust 
maps into a form of access control, which is subject-based, in that the subject is only permitted to 
access trusted services.  This type of access control can be implemented by some web browser as 
a means of screening sites visited by children [1, 41-45]. 
Some forms of service trust relate to competence of the trustee: 
 I only trust fourth year students who have an aggregate A grade to do this project. 
 I will only purchase PCs from Company ABC. 
A trustor’s trust in the competence of the trustee’s ability to provide a service differs from 
confidence trust in that, confidence applies to entities the trustor will use and competence applies 
to entities that perform some action on behalf of the trustor.   
Another form of service trust relates to reliability or integrity of the trustee.  In E-Commerce and 
E-Banking, the customer trusts the vendor or bank to support mechanisms that will ensure that 
passwords are not divulged and to prevent transactions from being monitored.  The vendor or 
bank is also trusted to maintain the privacy of any information such as name, address and credit 
card details, which it holds about the customer.  There have been some high-profile incidents in 
the UK recently where this trust has been broken.  Examples of this form of service trust are: 
 I will store these critical files on Groucho (as it has a RAID file system and it is archived 
every 2 hours).  Note that in this case the trustee does have access to the trustor’s resources. 
 I trust the newsagent to email me an electronic newspaper every morning before 8am. 
 I trust my internet bank not to divulge my name and address to companies for electronic 
marketing.  
4.3 Certification of Trustees 
This type of trust is based on certification of the trustworthiness of the trustee by a third party, so 
trust would be based on a criteria relating to the set of certificates presented by the trustee to the 
trustor.  Certificates are commonly used to authenticate identity or membership of a group in 
Internet applications [28, 46-51].  This may imply competence if the identity is a well-known 
organisation. However, professional certification is a common technique used to indicate 
competence in the medical world, commerce and engineering so could be applied to Internet 
services [23].   
Trustee Certification Examples  
 I trust Dr. Tom’s medical advice site as he is registered with the BMA. 
 I will only use downloaded software updates, which have Microsoft certificates. 
 I trust only VeriSign to certify programs that can run on my machine. 
 I trust anyone with a PGP certificates signed by two people I trust (each must have an 
average level of trust in my view). 
 I trust the identity of anyone authenticated by the Kerberos server in my domain. 
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Note that the certification authority is in fact providing a trust certification service so this is a 
special form of service provision trust but involves a third party in establishing the trust.  There 
are many papers discussing this specific form of trust service, which is the reason we define it as 
a separate classification.   
4.4 Delegation 
A trustor trusts a trustee to make decisions on its behalf, with respect to a resource or service that 
the trustor owns or controls [52].  This is also a special form of service provision – a trust 
decision-making service. 
Ding and Peterson [52] illustrate a novel way of implementing delegation, with hierarchical 
delegation tokens.  Their work relies heavily on cryptography.  They propose a classification of 
delegation schemes, with appropriate  protocols, which they analyse, based on efficiency, and 
compare with related work.  The ideas they express represent lower-level mappings from our 
concept of delegation in that they concentrate on access control. 
Delegation Examples  
 I trust my database manager to decide who has access to my database. 
 I delegate all decisions concerning my investments to my financial advisor. 
 I accept anonymous authorisation certificates for access to my resources issued by the 
WXYZ authorisation service. 
4.5 Infrastructure Trust 
This refers to the base infrastructure that the trustor must trust [35-37].  He must trust himself 
(implicit trust).  He should be able to trust his workstation, local network and local servers, 
which may implement security or other services in order to protect his infrastructure. 
It was recognised in early computing that in order to incorporate security (actually resource 
access trust) into applications, there was a need not only to implicitly trust the reference monitor, 
but also the administrative procedures that kept the monitor working.  The culmination of this 
work was the U.S. Department of Defense specification for a set of resources, known as the 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) [53] that had to be trusted by all applications executing on a 
machine  to support the required security policy. The TCB can be viewed as the set of hardware, 
firmware and software elements, which are used to implement the reference validation 
mechanism i.e. the  “validation of each reference to data or programs by any user (or program) 
against a list of authorized types of reference for that user”.  The TCB was seen as the primary 
component of a trusted computer containing all of the system elements supporting the isolation 
of objects (code and data) on which the protection is based.  It was aimed more at centralised 
systems implementing information labelling and preventing information flow to unauthorised 
users, rather than commercial or networked systems. 
Over the years, the TCB has increased in terms of number of components, and therefore size, 
leading to a higher probability of it being compromised.  To make the PC platform more 
trustworthy, an initiative was launched to develop and formalize a trusted PC framework [24]. 
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This initiative is being led by the Trusted Computing Platform Alliance, an amalgamation of 
several leading technology companies and research centres. 
Infrastructure Trust Examples 
 I trust hardware that has been certified by the Trusted PC Computer Base Certification 
Board. 
 The PC’s application software trusts the operating system. 
5 TRUST MANAGEMENT 
The paper by Blaze et. al. [54] was one of the first to introduce the term trust management, 
although prior security solutions for networked applications had an implicit notion of trust 
management based on PGP [47] or X.509 public-key certificates [46, 48], which are discussed in 
section 6. Blaze et. al. defined trust management as “a unified approach to specifying and 
interpreting security policies, credentials, relationships which allow direct authorisation of 
security-critical actions” [54].  They have implemented several automated trust management 
systems of note, namely: PolicyMaker [55-58], KeyNote [59-61] and REFEREE [41, 42] (in 
conjunction with Yang-Hua Chu and the W3C Consortium at MIT).  These are discussed in more 
detail in section 6. 
A common flaw with all these solutions is that they are used to identify a static form of trust, 
usually at the discretion of the application coder (that is, the programmer inserts code to evaluate 
trust, often at the start of a session).  However, trust can change with time.  Typically a customer 
uses an unknown service provider with some trepidation but if the service provided is high 
quality over a period of time, the customer’s trust in the service provider increases.  Current 
solutions do not address this problem of trust changing with time.  In order to handle this 
dynamic property of trust, solutions should have a notion of learning.  They should be able to 
adapt to the changing conditions of the environment in which the trust decision was made.  
However, current solutions have no notion of incorporating their own experiences (or that of 
others) in their decision-making process.   
Additionally, these systems unconditionally accept credentials offered by the trustee (client) and 
then decide what the client is permitted to do.  However, that may not be what the client 
currently wants to do.  Even though there may be a relationship between the trustor and trustee, 
the trustee may wish to function in some other capacity than previously agreed upon.  Thus, there 
is a need for negotiation in the trust decision process. 
Systems change and evolve so there is a need to monitor trust relationships to determine whether 
the criteria on which they are based still apply.  This could also involve the process of keeping 
track of the activities of the trustee and of determining the necessary action needed when the 
trustee violates the trustor’s trust.   
Trust management is thus concerned with collecting the information required to make a trust 
relationship decision, evaluating the criteria related to the trust relationship as well as monitoring 
and re-evaluating existing trust relationships.  None of the existing systems cover monitoring and 
re-evaluation of trust.  
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6 TRUST MANAGEMENT SOLUTIONS 
Most trust management systems focus on protocols for establishing trust in a particular context.  
Some make use of a trust policy language to allow the trustor to specify the criteria for a trustee 
to be considered trustworthy.   
6.1 Public Key Certificates 
A digital certificate is issued by a certification authority and verifies that a public key is owned 
by a particular entity [47].  The certification authority does not vouch for the trustworthiness of 
the key owner, but simply authenticates the owner’s identity.  This is necessary to establish a 
resource access or service provision trust relationship and may implicitly reduce the trustor’s risk 
in dealing with the trustee [23].  However, the policy governing what resources or services the  
trustee is permitted to access is not handled by the certificate infrastructure, but is left up to the 
application.  Two of the main certificate systems dealing with authentication,  PGP and X.509, 
are described below. 
The PGP trust model [47] is used for authentication relating to electronic mail type of 
applications between human users.  It supports a Web Of Trust model in that there is no 
centralised or hierarchical relationship between certification authorities as with X.509. The 
underlying assumptions of the model are that a trustor may trust other entities, may validate 
certificates from other entities or may trust third parties to validate certificates.   An introducer is 
an entity that signs someone else’s public key (and thus vouches for a name-public key binding).  
A meta-introducer can sign keys as well as specify who is a (trusted) introducer.  Thus, any 
entity can function as a certification authority.  Every key that a user trusts or signs has to have a 
degree of trust associated to it, namely: unknown, untrusted, marginally trusted or completely 
trusted.  It is also assumed that a user has an implicit trust (the highest form of trust in this 
model) in her own key.  It is possible to use these labels to specify complex criteria about the 
trustworthiness of keys.  For example, a user can specify that she only completely trusts a key if 
it is marginally trusted by a meta-introducer and completely trusted by a (trusted) introducer.  
Once keys are registered (along with their degree of trust) with the PGP system, then it computes 
a validity score (this measures how sure are we that this key belongs to this person).  It is now 
the responsibility of each entity to query the system and to acquire keys as they are needed.  
The X.509 trust model [46, 48] is a strictly hierarchical trust model for authentication.  Each 
entity must have a certificate that is signed by the central certification authority or another 
authority, which has been directly or indirectly certified by it.  This model assumes that 
certification authorities are organised into a universal “certification authority tree” and that all 
certificates within a local community will be signed by a certification authority that can be linked 
into this tree [54]. 
It is important to note that neither of these models can be used to model trust in all domains.  
Due to PGP’s lack of official mechanisms for the creation, acquisition and distribution of 
certificates it is considered unreliable for E-Commerce, but appropriate for personal 
communication.  X.509’s rigid hierarchical structure may lead to unnatural business alliances 
between competing companies that violate the natural order of trust.  Some applications, such as 
the reference information distribution systems described in section 7,  need certificates to have a 
lifespan longer than is currently allowed by either scheme.  
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6.2 Platform for Content Selection (PICS) 
PICS was developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) as a solution to the problem of 
protecting children from pornography on the Internet without infringing on one’s right to 
freedom of speech. The basic idea behind PICS is that there needs to be a filter between the 
potential viewer and web documents. It is a result of the “Censorship of the Internet” debate that 
took place in the US legislature.  PICS defines standards for the format and distribution of labels 
which are meta-document describing a web document.  It does not specify a vocabulary that a 
label must use, nor does it state which labels are important for a particular circumstance.  It is 
similar to stating “where on a package a label should appear, and in what font it should be 
printed, without specifying what it should say” [1] or what part of the label is important.   A 
PICS-compliant application should be able to read PICS labels and use the user-defined filtering 
rules to decide whether to accept or reject the document.  PICS makes no assumptions about the 
number of labels that can be attached to a document.  In concept, a document may have several 
labels that may be issued by different organisations.  A user has the right to choose any PICS 
filtering software and any label source (this entity is called a rating service).   
A rating system defines the label attributes and their corresponding range of values used by the 
rating service.  The following example is adapted from the W3C Recommendation on rating 
services and rating systems [44]. 
 
(     (PICS-version1.1) 
(rating-system “http://www.doc.worldwide.com/ratings/”) 
(rating-service “http://www.doc.worldwide.com/descrip.html”) 
(icon “icons/good.gif”) 
(name “The Computing Department Rating System”) 
(description “All about the rating of the pages offered by computing departments all over the world”) 
( category 
(transmit-as tc) 
(name “Teaching Material Content”) 
(min 0.0) 
(max 5.0) 
) 
( category 
(transmit-as rc) 
(name “Research Content”) 
(label (name “very little”) (value 0) (icon “icons/little.gif”) ) 
(label (name “a lot”) (value 1) (icon “icons/lots.gif”) ) 
) 
( category 
(transmit-as subject) 
(name “Document Subject”) 
(multivalue true) 
(unordered true) 
(label (name “SE”) (value 0) ) 
(label (name “AI”) (value 1) ) 
(label (name “PC”) (value 2) ) 
(label-only) 
) 
( category 
(transmit-as ref) 
(name “Number of references to other computing sites”) 
(integer) 
) 
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( category 
(transmit-as importance) 
(min 0) 
(max 100) 
) 
) 
The first section identifies the version of PICS being used, the rating system and the rating 
service.  The URL in the rating-system clause specifies the location of the document that has the 
human-readable description of the rating system.  The URL in the rating-service clause identifies 
the document with the human-readable description of the rating service.  This URL will also be 
included in all labels created by this service.  The icon, name and description clauses are self-
explanatory. The rest of the example specifies five label attributes; each identified by the 
keyword category.  Each category has a transmission name and may be followed by clauses that 
define the attribute’s allowable values.  The BNF for the syntax of a rating system can be found 
in [44] and a sample PICS label that uses the above rating system is shown below. 
 
( (PICS-version1.1) 
“http://www.doc.worldwide.com/descrip.html” 
labels on “1998.11.05T08:15-0500” 
until “1999.09.32T23:34-0000” 
for “http://www-dse.doc.ic.ac.uk/~per/index.html” 
by “Joe Green” 
ratings (tc 1.0 rc “a lot” subject “SE” ref 19 importance 90) 
) 
The above example identifies the rating service that created the label, sets the lifespan of the 
label, identifies the page being labelled, the person labelling the page and the actual values of the 
label’s attributes.  More complex labels can be constructed using the PICS label syntax described 
in [44]. 
Miller et. al. [44] states that there are three ways that labels can be distributed, namely: they can 
be embedded in web documents (through the use of a META tag); they can be requested by a 
user (the HTTP GET is used to request both the label and the web document) and they may be 
requested separately from label bureaux. 
The W3C has also published the PICSRules recommendation, which describes a rule-based, 
filtering policy language.  We now give some policies expressed in PICSRules (version 1.1), 
adapted from [45]. 
 
(PicsRule-1.1 
( 
Policy (RejectByURL (  “http://*@www.doc.ic.ac.uk*/*”    
       “http://*@www.yahoo.com*/*” ) 
   ) 
Policy (AcceptIf “otherwise”) 
) 
) 
The above example states that access to any Yahoo web page or any site at the department of 
computing at Imperial College is forbidden, but access to any other page is permitted.  It does 
not use PICS labels. 
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(PicsRule-1.1 
( 
ServiceInfo ( 
name “http://www.raters.org/ratings/v1.html” 
shortname “serv” 
bureauURL “http://labelbureau.raters.org/Ratings” 
) 
Policy (RejectUnless “(serv.pics)”) 
Policy (AcceptIf  “( (serv.pics > 3) and (serv.nudity = 0) )” ) 
Policy (RejectIf “otherwise”) 
) 
) 
The above example sets the rating service in the ServiceInfo and uses the labels from the service 
to select pages.  It states that all pages with labels must have the pics attribute in order for them 
to be viewed.  Additionally, the pages must have a pics attribute with value of three or more and 
also the nudity attribute should be equal to zero in order to be allowed.  All other pages will be 
rejected. 
 
(PicsRule-1.1 
( 
name ( 
rulename “More Complex” 
description “Highlight more features of PICSRules” 
) 
source ( 
sourceURL 
“http://www.complex.com/complex.html” ) 
) 
ServiceInfo ( 
name “http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/ratings/v1.html” 
shortname “DOC” 
) 
ServiceInfo ( 
name “http://www.raters.org/ratings/v1.html” 
shortname “serv” 
bureauURL “http://labelbureau.raters.org/Ratings” 
) 
Policy (RejectByURL (“http://*@www.badnews.com:*/*” 
“http:// *@www.baddernews.com:*/*”) 
) 
Policy (AcceptByURL “http://*good-entertainment.org/plays*”) 
 
Policy (AcceptIf  “(DOC.educational = 1)”  
Explanation “Always allow educational content” 
) 
Policy (RejectIf  “(DOC.violence >= 4)” 
Explanation “This is too scary” 
) 
Policy (RejectUnless “(serv.graphics < 4)”) 
Policy (AcceptIf “otherwise”) 
) 
) 
In the above example, the name clause defines a human readable name for the rule and a 
description.  The source clause specifies where the rule came from.  The source URL may 
contain a document that has information about the rule.  The first ServiceInfo clause specifies a 
rating service that the user wishes to use, giving it an alias.  The absence of the bureauURL tag 
means that only embedded labels will be used.  The other clauses reject pages from two sites, 
accept good plays, allow educational documents, reject documents with too much violence 
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(unless they are educational), block any page with too many graphics (with the exceptional of 
educational documents) and allow all other pages. 
The BNF of the PICSRules syntax is outlined in [45].  PICSRules is a powerful tag-based 
language that allows resource-access trust on the Internet. The effectiveness of the PICS 
framework lies in the expressiveness of the filtering languages and the quality of the rating 
services.  
6.3 AT& T PolicyMaker and KeyNote 
PolicyMaker is a trust management application, developed at AT&T Research Laboratories,  that 
specifies what a public key is authorised to do [54].  Traditional certificate frameworks such as 
PGP and X.509 do not bind access rights to the owner of the public key within the certificate 
framework.  Schemes such as these require a two-step process: a) the binding of a public key to 
its owner, which occurs within the certificate framework, and b) the binding of access rights to 
the identified key owner, which occurs outside the certificate framework.  In PolicyMaker, both 
occur in a single step that binds access rights to a public key. 
The PolicyMaker system is essentially a query engine which can either be built into applications 
(through a linked library) or run as a “daemon” service.  It evaluates whether a proposed action is 
consistent with local policy [1].  The inputs to the PolicyMaker interpreter are the local policy, 
the received credentials and an action string (which specifies the actions that the public key 
wants to perform).  The interpreter’s response to the application can either be yes or no or a list 
of restrictions that would make the action acceptable.  A policy is a trust assertion that is made 
by the local system and is unconditionally trusted by the system.  A credential is a signed trust 
assertion made by other entities and the signatures must be verified before the credentials can be 
used.  Policies and credentials are written in an assertion language. The syntax of an assertion is: 
 Source ASSERTS AuthorityStruct WHERE Filter 
Source represents the source of the assertion, AuthorityStruct represents the public key(s) to 
whom the assertion is applicable and Filter is the predicate that action strings must satisfy for the 
assertion to hold.  Filters are interpreted programs that can accept or reject action strings.  Note 
that Policymaker does not stipulate that a particular filter language (or assertion language) has to 
be used.  Any safe interpreted language can be used to implement either of these languages.  
Filter programs take as input, the current action string and the environment, which contains 
information about the current context (e.g. date, time, application name, etc.).  This environment 
can be used by the filter to enforce contextual constraints such as expiration times.  A filter also 
has access to information about the rest of the chain in which it is being evaluated, which makes 
it possible to design certificates that limit the degree to which their authority can be deferred.  
Although the filter language interpreter is external to PolicyMaker, the name of the language is 
given in assertions and must be known by anyone who needs to use the assertion. Any unknown 
or unsupported filter languages are ignored by PolicyMaker. 
The prototype for PolicyMaker had three associated assertion languages: AWKWARD (a safe 
version of AWK), Java and Safe-TCL.  It was hoped that leaving the assertion language an open 
issue would mean flexibility and greater programmability for PolicyMaker.  However, it was 
realised that the choice of an assertion language can affect the decision processing in 
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PolicyMaker. For a local policy, the source is always policy.  The following policy specifies that 
any doctor who is not a plastic surgeon should be trusted to give a check-up. 
 
policy  
ASSERTS doctor_key  
WHERE filter that allows check-up if the field is not plastic surgery 
For Policymaker to make a decision there must be at least one policy in the input supplied to it 
from the trust base. The following credential states that the BMA asserts that the person with key 
“0x12345abcd” is not a plastic surgeon. 
 
BMA_key  
ASSERTS “0x12345abcd”  
WHERE filter that returns “not a plastic surgeon”, if the field is not plastic surgery 
An assertion (whether policy or credential) states that the source trusts the public keys in the 
authority structure to be associated with action strings that satisfy the filter.  It is important to 
note that assertions can modify the action strings that they accept, through the use of 
Annotations.  Annotations are essentially a mechanism for communication between assertions 
(inter-assertion communication), as well as communication between the application and the 
credentials.  This allows PolicyMaker to append conditions to the action strings, if necessary.  A 
query to the PolicyMaker interpreter has the following format:  
 key1, key2, key3, ……… REQUESTS ActionString 
To check if “0x12345abcd” is allowed to give me a check-up, the interpreter is asked: 
 “0x12345abcd” REQUESTS “do check-up” 
The semantics of the action string is not known to PolicyMaker.  The processing of the action 
strings, as well as signature verification, is left entirely up to the calling application.  Action 
strings are generated and interpreted by the calling applications.  The filters however should have 
knowledge of the action strings.  The fact that signature verification is done by the calling 
application means that any signature scheme can be used, once the application provides the 
appropriate programs to perform the verification.  This allows Policymaker to exploit existing 
signature schemes.  PolicyMaker uses the credentials given to it to prove that the requested 
action complies with the policy (this process is referred to as compliance checking [55]).  In 
summary, an application gives the PolicyMaker engine, a (set of) requested action(s), a set of 
credentials and a policy and the engine tries to prove that the credentials contain a proof that the 
requested action(s) complies with the policy. 
KeyNote, the successor to PolicyMaker, was developed to improve on the weaknesses of 
PolicyMaker by AT&T Research Laboratories. It has the same design principles of assertions 
and queries [56, 60, 61] but includes two additional design goals, namely: standardisation and 
ease of integration [61].  In KeyNote, more is done in the trust management engine, rather than 
in the calling application (as was the case in PolicyMaker).  Signature verification is done in the 
KeyNote engine and a specific assertion language is used.  PolicyMaker allowed any choice of 
assertion language, which made its compliance checker difficult to integrate with applications.  
KeyNote’s predefined assertion language allows simpler integration with its compliance checker.  
The KeyNote engine is passed a list of credentials, policies, the public keys of the requester and 
an “Action Environment” (which is essentially a list of attribute-value pairs) by the calling 
application.  The action environment is generated by the application and contains all the 
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information relevant to the request, and so accurately reflects the application’s security 
requirements.  Identifying the attributes of this environment is the essential task in integrating 
KeyNote into any application.  The result of the KeyNote evaluation process is an application-
defined string, the simplest response being “authorized”.  The KeyNote assertion format is 
similar to email headers and is outlined in [61].  An example of a KeyNote assertion, taken from 
[56], is: 
 
KeyNote-Version: 1 
Authorizer: rsa-pkcs-hex:”1023abcd” 
Licensees: dsa-hex “986512a1” || rsa-pkcs1-hex:”19abcd02” 
Comment:  Authorizer delegates read access to either of the Licensees 
Conditions: ($file == “etc/passwd” && $access == “read”) -> {return “ok2} 
Signature: rsa-md5-pkcs1-hex:”f00f5673” 
As in PolicyMaker, assertions can either be policies or credentials.  POLICY in the Authorizer 
field identifies policies which are locally trusted and so do not need a signature.  The Licensees 
field specifies the principal(s) to which authority is given.  A simple, lightweight assertion 
language with no loops or recursion is used in order to enforce resource usage restrictions, to 
allow the assertions to be easily understood by humans and easily refined from high-level 
languages, etc. [56].  Compliance checking in PolicyMaker required repeated evaluation of 
assertions, along with an arbitrated “blackboard” for storage of intermediate results and 
communication between assertions, while compliance checking in KeyNote involves a depth-
first search that tries (using recursion) to satisfy at least one policy.  KeyNote has no inter-
assertion communication mechanisms.  Satisfying an assertion entails satisfying both the 
Conditions and Licensees fields.  The current implementation of the KeyNote Toolkit is written 
in C.  Neither system addresses the problem of how to discover that credentials are missing, and 
neither system supports negative assertions.  The authors claimed that both these systems are a 
more general solution to the trust management problem than public-key certificates.  However, 
they address only authorisation based on public keys, which still does not comprehensively cover 
the entire trust management problem.  They focus on establishing resource access trust, and 
possibly service provision trust. 
6.4 Rule-controlled Environment For Evaluation of Rules and Everything 
Else (REFEREE) 
REFEREE is a trust management system for making access decisions relating to Web documents 
developed by Yang-Hua Chu based on PolicyMaker [41, 42]. It considers a PICS label as the 
stereotypical web credential and uses the same theoretical framework as PolicyMaker to interpret 
trust policies and administer trust protocols, which are represented as software modules.  Like 
PolicyMaker and KeyNote, REFEREE is a recommendation-based, query engine so it needs to 
be integrated into a host application. It evaluates requests and returns a tri-value and a statement-
list, which is the justification for the answer.  A tri-value is either true, false or unknown.  True 
means “yes, the action may be taken because sufficient credentials exist for the action to be 
approved”, false means “no, the action must not be taken because sufficient credentials exist to 
deny the action” and unknown means “the trust management system was unable to find sufficient 
credentials either to approve or deny the requested action”.  Boolean operators were modified to 
allow reasoning about tri-values and special operators were added to create a complete logical 
framework for tri-values.  For example, true-if-unknown and false-if-unknown operators were 
defined to simulate negation of the unknown value. An ordered statement-list specifies 
information acquired during the execution of modules.  They are the means by which inter-
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module communication takes place.  All statements are “two element s-expressions”, similar to 
attribute value pairs.  The first item specifies the context of the statement and the second stating 
the statement’s content.  For example, the statement that John is untrustworthy in a certification 
REFEREE module would be:  
(  ( “certification module”) ( “John” (untrustworthy yes) ) ) 
The REFEREE system is essentially a collection of modules as basic building blocks, each 
dealing with a particular policy decision.  A module can delegate subtasks to other modules and 
make decisions based on the returned assertions.  All modules have the same interface as 
REFEREE – they accept inputs and return a tri-value and a statement-list.  The inputs are an 
action name and other arguments that provide information about the action and form the 
module’s trust base.  For example, a content selection module may have either a URL or the keys 
of the raters that make assertions about the URL as its input and its output is a tri-value with a 
statement-list. At the implementation level, a module consists of a policy and zero or more 
interpreters.  A policy is a code segment written in a trust policy language and the interpreters are 
programs for interpreting the policy or other interpreters. The set of interpreters in a module is 
hierarchical; the module policy is interpreted by the highest-level interpreter; which in turn is 
interpreted by a lower-level interpreter and so on.    
REFEREE goes through two phases in its lifetime.  In the bootstrap phase, the host application 
gives it the unconditionally trusted assertions and a module database.  A module database is a 
repository of action names, similar to a DNS server in that it allows a module to be referred to by 
an action name.  In the query phase, the host application provides the action and other arguments 
such as credentials, which are passed onto the appropriate module from the module database.  
REFEREE runs the module’s interpreter with the policy and list of arguments, which may result 
in other modules being invoked, then returns an answer to the host application. 
Profiles-0.92 is rule-based trust policy language, designed to work with REFEREE, in which 
each rule is an s-expression with an operator as the first element followed by operands.  Rules 
are evaluated top down and the returned value of the last rule is the policy’s returned value.  
Rules return tri-values and statement-lists.  The BNF for the syntax can be found in [42].  The 
following policies highlight some features of this language. 
 
( threshold-and 
2 
(not (url-match URL (“http://www.cam.ac.uk” “http://www.bath.ac.uk”))) 
(url-match URL (“http://www.ic.ac.uk”)) 
unknown 
) 
The above policy states that all material from Cambridge University and the University of Bath 
will be blocked, and only material from Imperial College will be automatically downloaded.  The 
user will be prompted about all other material. 
 
( invoke “load-label” STATEMENT-LIST URL 
“http://web.mit.edu/ratings/CodeSafety.html” 
(“http://bureau.mit.edu” “http://bureau.cmu.edu”) 
) 
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( match 
((“load-label”) 
(((version “PICS-1.1”) * 
(service “http://web.mit.edu/ratings/CodeSafety.html”) * 
(ratings  (RESTRICT > virus 8)) 
))) 
 STATEMENT-LIST 
) 
This policy states that labels from the MIT and CMU bureaus should be used and only pages 
with labels that state that the document has been thoroughly checked for viruses can be 
downloaded.  For this example, the invoke clause runs the load label module, which loads the 
labels from the bureaus. The match clause searches all the labels for the pattern described. 
6.5 IBM Trust Establishment Framework 
IBM views trust establishment as the enabling component of E-Commerce [62].  They state that 
the underlying trust implications involved in an e-business transaction can be solved using 
certificates. Certificates can be issued by various bodies, vouching for an entity in a particular 
role, for example vouching for someone’s status as a buyer or seller or both. IBM has developed 
a role-based access control model that uses certificates, a Java-based Trust Establishment module 
and a Trust Policy Language (TPL).  Their system is similar to PolicyMaker, but permits 
negative rules preventing access. The default certificate scheme used is X.509 v3, though other 
certificate formats are supported.  The Trust Establishment module validates the client’s 
certificate and then maps the certificate owner to a role.  The certificate need not bind to a user’s 
identity, but could just state that the user is an employee of Company XYZ or a  public key can 
be used to map onto an anonymous role.  Local policy specified in their TPL defines what a role 
is permitted to do.  The syntax for TPL is written in XML and is described in [62, 63].  The 
primitive structure in TPL is a group.  For each group, there are rules governing group 
membership.  These rules essentially specify which certificates to check.  The following example 
is taken from [63].  
 
<POLICY> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”self”> 
</GROUP> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”partners”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”partner” TYPE=”partner” FROM “self”>  
</INCLUSION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
 
<GROUP NAME=”departments”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”partner” TYPE=”partner” FROM=”partners” 
</INCLUSION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
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<GROUP NAME=”customers”> 
<RULE> 
<INCLUSION ID=”customer” TYPE=”employee” FROM=”departments”> 
</INCLUSION> 
<FUNCTION> 
<GT> 
<FIELD ID=”customer” NAME=”rank”></FIELD> 
<CONST>3</CONST> 
</GT> 
</FUNCTION> 
</RULE> 
</GROUP> 
 
</POLICY> 
The first group defined is the originating retailer. Then, it is stated that entities that have partner 
certificates, signed by the original retailer, are placed in the group partners.  The group 
department is defined as any user having a partner certificate signed by the partners group.  
Finally, the customer group consists of anyone that has an employee certificate signed by a 
member of the departments group who has a rank greater than 3.  In summary, the policy states 
that a customer is an employee of a department of a partner company.  After the Trust 
Establishment module has determined that an entity can be assigned to a particular role, it then 
sends this information to another module, which stipulates the access rights that are bound to the 
particular role.    
6.6 Logic-Based Formalisms of Trust 
Trust involves specifying and reasoning about beliefs.  Forms of first order predicate logic [64-
67] or (modified) modal logic [68-71] have been used to represent trust and its associated 
concepts.  A logic used to formalise trust must represent actions and interactions to cater for 
distributed agents [72, 73]. 
Simple relational formalisms are used to model trust with statements of the form Ta b, which 
means “a trusts b” [64-67].  Each formalism extends this primitive construct with features such 
as temporal constraints and predicate arguments.  Given these primitives, traditional conjunction, 
implication, negation and disjunction operators, these logical frameworks express trust rules 
(such as trust is not transitive) in their language and reason about these properties.  In our 
opinion these simple formalisms are not capable of modelling the complex trust relationships 
found in the Internet. 
Burrows, Abadi and Needham [65] propose a language to specify the steps followed in the 
authentication process between two entities (resource access protocol analysis). The language is 
founded on cryptographic reasoning with logical operators defined to deal with notions of shared 
keys, public keys, encrypted statements, secrets, nonce freshness and statement jurisdiction (for 
authentication servers and certificate authorities).  It should be possible to answer the following 
questions about a protocol specified in this language: 
 What does this protocol achieve? 
 Does this protocol need more assumptions than another one? 
 Does this protocol do anything unnecessary that could be left out without weakening it? 
 Does this protocol encrypt something that could be sent in clear without weakening it? 
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The language can be used to specify protocol assumptions and interactions and  appears to be 
suitable for modelling trust establishment protocols.  In designing the language many simplifying 
assumptions were made. As stated in [65], “Since we operate at an abstract level, we do not 
consider errors introduced by concrete implementations of a protocol, such as deadlocks, or even 
inappropriate use of cryptosystems. Furthermore, while we allow for the possibility of hostile 
intruders, there is no attempt to deal with the authentication of an untrustworthy principal, nor 
detect weaknesses of encryption schemes or unauthorised release of secrets. Rather, our study 
concentrates on the beliefs of trustworthy parties involved in the protocols and on the evolution 
of these beliefs as a consequence of communication.”  Also, analysis using this language requires 
a language expert to read through the logical statements, look at the implications and reason 
about them. 
The Authorization Specification Language (ASL) by Jajodi, Samarati and Subrahmanian [66] is 
used to specify authorization rules and makes explicit the need for the separation of policies and 
mechanisms.  ASL supports the specification of the closed policy model (all allowable accesses 
must be specified) and the open policy model (all denied accesses must be explicitly specified) 
using a common architectural framework.  It also supports role-based access control.  The 
separation of the concepts of policy and mechanism allows the specification and implementation 
of more flexible systems, as the access control model need not be hard coded into the system.  
This language is an excellent tool for the specification and analysis of resource access trust. 
Modal logics can be used to express possibility, necessity, belief, knowledge, temporal 
progression and other modalities [68-71].  It is an extension of traditional logics (propositional 
and predicate). The □ (necessity) operator and the ◊ (possibility) operator are added to the 
traditional syntax.  The notion of possible worlds (or multiple words) is fundamental to the 
interpretation of modal logics and simply states that a statement will have a different meaning 
depending on the world it is in.  Kripke structures are used  to represent possible worlds, where a 
Kripke structure consists of the set of all possible worlds and an accessibility relation (which 
may be referred to as a possibility relation depending on the modal logic).  The accessibility 
relation states the conditions for which an agent can access a world.   
In [70], Jones and Firozabadi address the issue of the reliability of an agent’s transmission. They 
use a modal logic of action developed by Kanger, Porn and Lindahl to model agent’s actions.  
For example, Ei p means “agent i brings it about that p”.  They use a variant of a normal modal 
logic of type KD45 as the foundation for their belief system. For example, Bi A means “agent i 
believes that A”.  The topic of institutional power is incorporated through the use of a counts as 
operator.  Institutional power refers to the fact that a person performing an act in a particular 
institution will lead to the formation of an institutional fact.  In a different institution, this fact 
cannot be established.  For example, a minister performing a marriage ceremony at a church 
leads to the fact that two people are married; yet in a different church this fact will not exist.  
They adopt the relevant axiomatic schemas into their formalism and use their composite 
language to model various trust scenarios. For example, b’s belief that a sees to it that m is 
expressed as: 
Bb Ea m 
They also use their language to model the concepts of deception and an entity’s trust in another 
entity.  In their own words “We do not investigate the formal representations of procedures by 
means of which trust-relations between agents can be established. Assuming the existence of a 
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trust-relation, we try to make explicit the reasoning patterns characteristic of a trusting agent.”  
This formalism can be easily modified to express and reason about establishing trust, of any 
particular context. 
Rangan [71] views a distributed system as a collection of agents communicating with each other 
through message passing in which the state of an agent is it’s message history (all sent and 
received messages).  The state of the system is the state of all the agents in the system.  He then 
devises conditions that function as his accessibility relation (in this context, possibility relation is 
a more accurate term).  His model consists of simple trust statements (for example Bi p, which 
means “agent i believes proposition p”) and properties such as transitivity, Euclidean property, 
etc. are defined.  These constructs are then used to specify systems and analyse them with respect 
to the property (or properties) of interest. Rangan’s model more fluently follows the traditional 
lines of modal logics of beliefs than does Jones and Firozabadi’s, but the model is simpler in the 
sense of the non-treatment of actions and their effects. 
After outlining the various attempts made to model trust, we take a look at how these attempts 
have been applied to specific domains. 
7 APPLICATIONS OF TRUST MANAGEMENT 
Most of the literature relating to trust applications really discusses security requirements relating 
to authentication, confidentially, data-integrity or non-repudiation rather than trust as we defined 
it.  We have selected a few application domains that highlight some specific trust management 
requirements.   
7.1 Medical Information Systems 
Medicine has many sub-disciplines each with its own set of trust issues but based on a sound 
ethical foundation.  The difficulty in computerising some aspects of medicine lies in transferring 
these ethics to the computer systems.  The following discussion only considers Clinical 
Information Systems and Medical Document Distribution.  
Clinical Information Systems is a relatively mature field.  Countries such as the United States 
[74], Iceland [75] and Britain [76-79] have been developing and deploying these systems for 
many years.  However, many of the systems in use, do not accurately reflect the trust issues in 
their particular field.  There are three major problems with emerging medical systems, namely: 
electronic trust relationships not matching the relationship in the real world, a focus on 
centralisation and putting too much power in the hands of one body, and the lack of sufficient 
mechanisms to de-identify records.  
Britain’s National Health System has proposed a cryptography strategy to secure clinical 
systems.  Anderson [80] describes the problems in their proposal, which are: insufficient 
attention to the safety aspects of clinical messaging, the use of an incorrect threat model, the 
inconsistency between the trust relationship in professional practice and that of the electronic 
trust relationship, the underestimation of encryption implementation costs, the prominence of 
key escrow in initial prototypes despite denial of its importance, the relegation of medico-legal 
issues to the background, the use of weak encryption mechanisms, problems with the protocol 
and certification mechanisms, and the lack of security expertise.  Anderson also gives a more 
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general discussion of the security issues in medical practice in the United Kingdom in [81], 
where he highlights examples of compromises of deployed clinical information systems. 
In an effort to define a reference security model for clinical information systems [82], Anderson 
looks at the ethical basis of clinical information systems, looks at the threat model and defines a 
security policy.  In his security policy [83], he proposes nine principles that should be in every 
system that will ensure medical systems match their off-line counterparts.  These principles are: 
i. Access control: each identifiable clinical record shall be marked with an access control list 
naming the people or groups of people who may read it and append data to it.  The system 
shall prevent anyone not on the access control list from accessing the record in any way. 
ii. Record opening: a clinician may open a record with herself and the patient on the access 
control lost.  Where a patient has been referred, she may open a record with herself, the 
patient and the referring clinician(s) on the access control list. 
iii. Control: one of the clinicians on the access control list must be marked as being 
responsible.  Only she may alter the access control list, and she may only add other health 
care professionals to it. 
iv. Consent and notification: the responsible clinician must notify the patient of the names on 
his record’s access control list when it is opened, of all subsequent additions, and whenever 
responsibility is transferred.  His consent must also be obtained, except in emergency or in 
the case of statutory exemptions. 
v. Persistence: no one shall have the ability to delete clinical information until the appropriate 
time period has expired. 
vi. Attribution: all accesses to clinical records shall be marked on the record with the subject’s 
name, as well as the date and time.  An audit trail must also be kept of all deletions. 
vii. Information flow: information derived from record A may be appended to record B if and 
only if B’s access control list is contained in A’s. 
viii. Aggregation control: there shall be effective measures to prevent the aggregation of 
personal health information.  In particular, patients must receive special notification if any 
person whom it is proposed to add to their access control list already has access to personal 
health information on a large number of people. 
ix. Trusted computing base: computer systems that handle personal health information shall 
have a subsystem that enforces the above principles in an effective way.  Its effectiveness 
shall be subject to evaluation by independent experts. 
These principles address the majority of trust issues in the clinical information systems.  
However, issues like de-identification of patient records and centralisation require more focus. 
WAX is “a system for publishing electronic medical books containing information such as 
treatment protocols, drug formularies and government regulations to which healthcare 
professionals need frequent access in support of clinical decision-making” [84].  The main 
security issue in WAX is to guarantee that the users can verify the author and publisher of the 
books.  The initial solution involved using X.509 certificates as the primary trust mechanism and 
hashes of the catalogues as the secondary trust mechanism.  In the development phase of the 
project, they discovered that because X.509 certificates lifetimes were shorter than the lifetime of 
a book.  Issues arose as to what would happen when the certificate became obsolete.  What does 
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certificate obsolescence mean?  Does it differ from certificate revocation?  Would another 
certificate have to be issued for a book, whose certificate is no longer valid?  And if certificate 
re-issue was chosen, what would the effects be on the system?  Given these questions, a decision 
was made to use the catalogue hashes as the primary trust mechanism.  Anderson et. al. [85] 
defined a mechanism to incorporate this catalogue-based trust into the World Wide Web 
framework, by defining special HTML tags.   
7.2 Information Retrieval Systems 
From sections 6.2 and 6.4, we can see that attempts have been made to perform trust 
management in this domain.  The primary trust questions that should be asked in this field are 
“Does this piece of information meet my viewing needs?”,  “Will I get the information I 
requested?” and “Will the information have any effects on my system?”   
The issues arising from the first question are “How does one label a particular piece of 
information?” and “How does one specify one viewing requirements?”  For the Internet, the de 
facto standard for describing information is a PICS label.  To specify one’s viewing tastes one 
can use any PICS-compliant filtering language, such as PICSRules or profiles-0.92.  However, 
for other information retrieval systems, standards are yet to be established.  
“Will I get the information I requested?” requires clarification. This question more specifically 
asks “Will I get an authentic copy of the information that I requested?” and “Will I get only the 
information I requested?”  Many solutions to the former question have been created, using public 
key cryptography.  However, we see the WAX system [85] taking a different approach and using 
hashes instead.   
The latter question is a much more difficult question to answer and we have not come across any 
solutions.  The question of the effects that information will have on one’s system relates directly 
to active content.  Mechanisms exist to minimise the risk of active documents, namely the use of 
signatures [86] so that only active documents from trusted sources are downloaded, but little has 
been done with respect to the enforcement of the policy of not allowing active content to affect a 
system. 
It is also necessary to ensure that information retrieval systems do not disseminate information 
that is not for general distribution.  Myers and Liskov in [87] describe a model that allows for the 
protection of private and secret data using labels, which state the flow of information in a 
decentralized system.  They describe a language, Jif (Java Information Flow), which permits 
static checking of these labels.  Their model assumes mutual distrust amongst the entities in the 
systems and Jif is assumed to run on a trusted execution platform that enforces the rules of the 
model (as stated in the labels).  The emphasis in this work is on the prevention of information 
leakage from one level to another. 
The only examples of systems that directly address trust in Information Retrieval Systems are 
REFEREE and PolicyMaker, which was integrated with PICS [1], as discussed in section 6. 
7.3 Mobile code 
Mobile agents migrate code and data from one machine to another to perform tasks on behalf of 
a user.  There have been suggestions that this can be used for network management but one of 
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the most promising applications is a local agent which performs actions such as message 
filtering, email to voice translation, compression or information filtering on behalf of mobile 
users with limited capability computing devices and communicating via a wireless link.  There 
are many applications that download mobile code, such as an applet or a servlet, to perform a 
complex transaction on behalf of a user on a remote machine.  A mobile agent can be considered 
mobile code plus mobile data  
The primary trust concern for mobile code relates to access to trustor resources as the mobile 
code could steal information from the server and damage or make excessive use of local 
resources.  Another valid concern is the threat that servers pose to mobile agents (service 
provision trust) as they could modify or steal information contained in agents [4], delay their 
migration or even modify their code.   
Emphasis in the literature is mostly on techniques for preventing malicious agents from harming 
their execution environment.  The issue of trust has been sparsely mentioned.  Wilhelm et. al. [5] 
gave one of the more comprehensive discussions on the issue of trust in mobile systems.  They 
identified what they referred as the four foundations of trust, namely: blind trust, trust based on 
(a good) reputation, trust based on control and punishment and trust based on policy 
enforcement.  Their solution to the trust in mobile agent systems problem was the CryPO 
protocol, based on tamper-proof hardware to provide tamper-proof environments, which are the 
foundation for the agent executor.  Agents assert which environment manufacturers they trust.  
The protocol uses certificates and encryption technology to ensure security and is essentially an 
extension of the certification framework. 
Mobile agents will not be expected to roam in only one domain.  Realistically, there are a 
number of security domains, with differing structures.  Thus, a mobile agent will be expected to 
be able to handle navigation between security domains.  This raises the issue of secure 
interoperation.  In an effort to solve this problem, Gong and Qian [88] describe a mathematical 
framework for secure interoperation.  Swarup and Schmidt [17] also briefly discuss this issue, 
highlighting the trust management mechanisms, policy negotiation protocols and mobility 
protocols.  No formal trust management framework has been discussed, designed or 
implemented in this field.  Research in this field [5, 6, 89] is focused on formulating the best 
protocol to ensure that the mobile agent does not cause the server any harm.  These protocols 
define the process of trust establishment, but the other components of trust are totally ignored.  
Another trust issue concerns agent-to-agent interaction.  The situation may arise where it is 
necessary for agents to cooperate to complete a task.  How do agents trust each other?  In [70], 
applied modal logic is used to define the characteristics of a trusting agent.  This logical 
formalism of interacting trusting agents was discussed in Section 6.6.  It is an interesting 
discussion on trust in agent-to-agent interactions.  
8 SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
Our definition of trust as the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably, 
securely and reliably within a specified context seems to cover most of the attributes needed for 
trust in internet applications.  We have also provided a taxonomy of different categories of trust 
but often applications and solutions fall into more than one category.  Trust management is 
concerned with collecting the information required to make a trust relationship decision, 
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evaluating the criteria related to the trust relationship as well as monitoring and re-evaluating 
existing trust relationships.  Systems that evaluate trust are quite closely tied to systems that 
implement access control or authentication.  Current solutions to the trust problem do not 
acknowledge that trust changes over time and thus have no mechanism for monitoring trust 
relationships to re-evaluate their constraints.  Most solutions do not recognize the need for 
entities to learn from their experience in order to dynamically determine and adjust trust levels. 
Evaluation of trust, only when a relationship is set up does not cater for the evolution of the 
relationship from its stated initial purpose to accommodate new forms of interaction, which is 
common in business relationships.   We intend to build a system that deals with these issues.  
We already have a policy specification language called Ponder [15], which can be used to define 
authorisation and security management policies.  We hope to extend this to allow the 
specification of more abstract and potentially complex trust relationships between entities and 
across organisational domains. We will use the policy refinement tools, being developed, to 
generate the Ponder policy specification.  This can be translated into implementation 
mechanisms such as Windows security templates, firewall rules or Java security policy.  It can 
also be used to generate event triggered obligation policies for security management, which can 
for example choose particular encryption techniques for connections based on trust requirements.  
There is also a need for a toolkit to aid the establishment, analysis, reasoning and monitoring of 
trust relationships.  The toolkit must support the concepts of trust quantification from third 
parties and delegation of trust decisions, which may be likely in automated trust systems.  The 
analysis and reasoning must address issue such as is the trust consistent with application 
constraints, are there conflicts in the specification of what trust relationships apply to particular 
entities and what trust relationships are implicit?  Current work on trust analysis has taken a 
simplistic approach and are not rigorous or complete enough to model current systems.  We 
envisage the need to translate the trust into a logic framework in order to perform this analysis.  
Our current effort is in the development of a trust specification and analysis language called 
SULTAN for specifying and reasoning about trust relationships.  Reasoning in this context 
involves querying the entities, relationships and the trust network to view the ramifications of 
trust decisions and highlight and eliminate trust conflicts.  We intend to produce a 
comprehensive trust toolkit as part of a new collaborative initiative in Trusted e-service within 
the UK.  Another objective of this initiative is to integrate concepts of risk-management, from 
the financial world, with our concepts of trust management. 
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